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The International Criminal Court: The Dream and the Reality 
The idea of a just world has a long 
history. It appeared in the theoretical 
works of philosophers and lawyers 
from early ages. Ancient Romans 
used to say that law is the ‘art of good 
and justice’. But it was only after the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo international 
military tribunals in the middle of 
the twentieth century that the idea 
of justice for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity started to sharpen. 
Nevertheless it took more than 50 years 
to create new international criminal 
tribunals (for Yugoslavia and Rwanda) 
and they still were of an ad hoc nature. 
The negotiations for the creation of 
a permanent international criminal 
court were ongoing for almost 50 years 
and were finalised with the signing of 
the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998, which 
entered into force in 2002 and started 
to operate in 2003.
But after the ICC started to operate, 
the dreams and realities started to 
clash. Analysing the activity of the ICC 
we always face ‘strange’ facts. These 
facts are really disturbing and because 
of this some commentators prefer 
to not mention them. Nevertheless 
without understanding the logic of 
these disturbing facts it is impossible to 
understand the reality of the ICC as an 
institution. Here are some examples:
1. The very first witness at the very 
first trial at the ICC (Lubanga trial, 
DRC situation) confessed right in 
the courtroom that he gave false 
evidence and was coached to do so 
by the prosecution. The court did 
not take action on this matter.
2. In the trial of Germain Katanga 
(DRC situation) the prosecution 
did not prove any of the charges 
it brought against the accused. But 
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instead of acquitting the accused, 
the court changed the charges and 
found Katanga guilty in relation to 
the new charges it had imposed.
3. During the announcement of the 
judgment in the case of Ngudjolo 
Chui (DRC situation) the presiding 
judge said the following: ‘Mr. Chui, 
the fact that we are acquitting 
you does not mean that you are 
innocent’. This is a total and 
demonstrative violation of the 
presumption of innocence.
4. The President of Cote-d’Ivoire, 
Laurent Gbagbo, was imprisoned 
by the ICC for four years without 
trial. He spent almost two and a 
half years in prison even without 
confirmation of charges. In any 
local legal system no person could 
be detained without confirmed 
charges. The first hearings for 
confirmation of charges ended 
with an agreement by the judges 
that there was no case. Instead of 
dismissing the case, the majority 
(two judges against one) decided 
to give the prosecution ‘more time 
to collect more evidence’. After a 
second attempt the ICC Pre-Trial 
Chamber finally confirmed the 
charges. The decision was adopted 
by the majority (two to one). The 
dissenting judge claimed that there 
was still no case. The defence 
tried to appeal this decision to the 
Appeals Chamber, but the Pre-Trial 
Chamber refused permission to 
appeal.
5. In the case against Uhuru Kenyatta 
and others (Kenya situation) the 
prosecution withdrew the case 
against Kenyatta and his co-accused 
after the charges were confirmed 
by the court. The trouble with 
this situation is that prosecution 
said, at this stage, that there was 
no evidence. But, if that were the 
case, how was the court able to 
confirm the charges without seeing 
supporting evidence for the charges?
6.  In the case against Muammar 
Gaddafi after the assassination 
of the accused the court simply 
‘terminated the proceedings’. 
We have seen a lot of so-called 
contempt cases when certain 
individuals were put on trial 
because of the interruption of the 
integrity of the proceedings, for 
example, cases of bribing witnesses, 
or refusal to give evidence. But 
what could be more damaging to 
the integrity of the proceedings than 
the assassination of the accused? 
However, notwithstanding the fact 
that the killing was filmed and the 
criminals could easily be identified, 
the whole issue was not discussed 
or considered by the court.
7. During the trial in the case of former 
Vice-President of DRC Jean-Pierre 
Bemba all his defence team (with 
the exception of one non-African 
member) were violently arrested.
In relation to the disturbing facts 
listed above, we face the question 
of whether to ignore the facts or 
to interrogate the concept of the 
ICC. Because these facts cannot be 
explained by mistakes and negligence. 
They also cannot be explained if we 
consider the ICC as an international 
institution of the highest degree of legal 
standards and integrity. This means that 
these facts cannot be explained within 
the established concept of the ICC as 
an international court, as a guardian of 
law and justice. And thus we have to 
revisit this official concept. 
The official aim of the International 
Criminal Court is enshrined in article 1 
of the Rome Statute. It says that the ICC 
is established ‘to exercise jurisdiction 
over persons for the most serious 
crimes of international concern’. Thus 
the prosecution of the most serious 
international crimes is proclaimed as its 
main aim. But the practice of the ICC 
shows that its activities are not in line 
with this declared aim.
The situation in Cote-d’Ivoire was 
brought to the attention of the ICC 
in 2003, but until 2011 the Court did 
nothing. Even eight years later the ICC 
acted not in the context of the case 
that was brought to it in 2003, but in 
the context of the new situation of the 
forcible removal of President Gbagbo. 
And in this context the ICC acted really 
quickly, issuing an order for the arrest 
of Laurent Gbagbo after a few weeks. 
The situation in Libya was brought 
to the ICC’s attention by the UN 
Security Council when NATO forces 
were preparing to invade the country. 
At that time Libyan citizens had the 
highest social guarantees. Now Libya is 
totally destroyed, its statehood is under 
serious doubt and, more than 4 years 
after the coup, thousands of refugees 
are still leaving the country. The ICC 
issued no indictments for those who 
ruined the state. Instead it issued 
indictments against those who built 
that state.
The situation in the Central African 
Republic (CAR) was brought to the 
attention of the ICC in 2005, but the 
only action taken during these ten years 
is a case against former Vice-President 
of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo Jean-Pierre Bemba. Why was 
Bemba indicted by the ICC? Because 
he sent his troops to the legitimate CAR 
President Patasse, responding to his 
official request to help him to suppress 
an armed rebellion. Now the legitimate 
CAR President has been overthrown, 
the country is in ruins and ICC has 
produced no indictments against those 
responsible for the destruction.
When complaints about the 
situation in Uganda were lodged 
the ICC did nothing except publish 
vague orders for the arrest of three 
people, which were never followed 
through. Investigations by the ICC in 
Mali and Nigeria did not stop people 
from suffering as a result of al-Qaeda 
and Boko Haram’s terrorist actions. 
But the ICC openly sided itself with 
these organisations, warning Malian 
and Nigerian leaders that they might 
be called to The Hague if they did 
not defend the human rights of these 
terrorists. 
So where has the ICC brought 
peace? Where has it brought justice? It 
appears to have very little or no interest 
in most of the international human 
rights crimes which are happening 
all over the world. At the same time 
the ICC becomes actively involved 
in certain conflicts and it would be 
difficult not to notice that its activity 
in many cases is highly biased towards 
one side of the conflict. 
Another important fact should be 
highlighted. When taking its decisions, 
the International Criminal Court 
seems to be a law unto itself. In this 
respect, it:
• gravely violates the existing rules of 
international law; 
• derogates the existing standards of 
law and jurisprudence; and
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• creates new rules, i.e. its own law.
The violation of existing rules of 
international law
The practice of ICC shows that some 
of its cases are based on the grave 
violation of fundamental principles 
of modern international law, namely 
the principle of equality of states, 
the principle of consent of states and 
the voluntary nature of international 
law. In this respect special attention 
should be paid to the situations in 
Libya and Sudan (and subsequently 
to all Sudanese and Libyan cases). 
Analysis shows that these situations 
were ‘referred’ to the ICC in violation 
of international law. The glaring nature 
and the graveness of these violations 
force us to conclude that they cannot 
have been made through ignorance or 
negligence, but must have been made 
consciously to destroy or challenge the 
very basis of modern international law.
The situation in Sudan was referred 
by the UN Security Council to the ICC 
in March 2005 and the situation in 
Libya in February 2011. The problem 
of these referrals is that they were not 
taken in accordance with international 
law. The main question that arises in 
this regard is: on what legal basis has 
the Security Council acted? 
In its Resolution 1593 (2005) 
the Security Council (UNSC) failed 
to name any exact article of any 
exact legal document in support of 
its decision. It only said that it was 
‘acting under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter’. Reference to a ‘chapter’ is 
quite disturbing from the legal point 
of view, because it shows that the 
Security Council indeed could not 
name any exact article or clause to 
justify its decision. Legal decisions must 
be based on specific articles and even 
clauses of articles of a treaty, not on 
whole chapters. The vague reference 
to the chapter as a whole is itself clear 
proof of the absence of any legal basis 
for this decision. 
It is interesting to note that the ICC 
Pre-Trial Chamber attempted to atone 
for this legal impotence by the Security 
Council. It claimed that the Security 
Council acted pursuant to Article 13b 
of the Rome Statute. This attempt to 
justify the referral was even more legally 
inept than the UNSC’s failure to give 
any explanation, because the powers 
of the Security Council are regulated by 
the United Nations Charter, not by any 
other treaty.  The UNSC simply could 
not act on the basis of the ICC Statute. 
The attempt to claim that UNSC based 
its powers on another treaty and not 
the UN Charter is scandalous and 
illegal. The Security Council does not 
have the right to use powers which it 
does not enjoy according to the UN 
Charter, and, moreover, in this case 
applying it to a State which is not a 
party to the Rome Statute! 
The UN Charter does not give 
the Security Council the right to 
refer situations to the ICC. This is the 
only possible conclusion if we take 
into consideration the principles of 
international law. Such a power is too 
serious to be considered as ‘implied’ 
and not to be included in the Charter 
as the legal basis for the Security 
Council’s actions. Thus, in the absence 
of any amendments to the UN Charter 
itself, the Security Council does not 
have the right to refer situations to the 
ICC. This is especially so in relation to 
the States which are not parties to the 
Rome Statute. Members of the United 
Nations have given their consent only 
to those powers of the UN Security 
Council which are enunciated in the 
UN Charter, not to powers expressed 
in other treaties. 
There are many other legal defects 
in these ‘referral’ cases. For example, 
paragraph 1 of UNSC Resolution 
1593 (2005) says that it is referring 
the situation in Darfur “since 1 July 
2002” to the ICC Prosecutor. But the 
very resolution was adopted on 31 
March 2005! On what legal basis does 
the Security Council claim the right 
to apply criminal law with retroactive 
effect? Where is it stated that the 
Security Council has such a power? It is 
totally contrary to common principles 
of law! Let us imagine that after the 
UNSC referral Sudan would sign and 
ratify the ICC Statute. What would be 
the legal effect of article 11 of the ICC 
Statute which regulates the temporal 
jurisdiction of ICC? Paragraph 1 of 
this article states that “The Court has 
jurisdiction only with respect to crimes 
committed after the entry into force of 
this Statute.” Paragraph 2 of the same 
article says, “If a State becomes a party 
to this Statute after its entry into force, 
the Court may exercise its jurisdiction 
only with respect to crimes committed 
after the entry into force of this Statute 
for that State, unless that State has 
made a declaration under article 12, 
paragraph 3.”  And what about Article 
24 which specifies that “no person 
shall be criminally responsible under 
this Statute for conduct prior to the 
entry into force of the Statute”? 
Obviously the decision of the UN 
Security Council is discriminatory 
against Sudanese citizens indicted by 
the ICC because different rules apply 
to them as opposed to citizens of states 
which have signed the ICC statute. 
Many international human 
rights treaties specifically prohibit 
discrimination in criminal proceedings: 
if we accept that it is possible to initiate 
proceedings against a State which 
is not a party to the ICC (whether 
through the UN Security Council or by 
any other means) then we must accept 
the legality of discrimination. But it 
is absurd to say that an international 
treaty may legalise such discrimination. 
It is difficult to believe that states 
decided to discriminate between 
accused persons from a state party 
and accused persons from a non-state 
party, for such discrimination would 
be contrary to the most basic human 
rights. If a thesis leads to an absurd 
conclusion, then the thesis should be 
abandoned. Thus it must be concluded 
that without the amendment of the 
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UN Charter, any referral to the ICC of 
a situation in a non-signatory state is 
not possible. 
There are many other legal 
problems with these ‘referral’ UNSC 
resolutions. For example, what is the 
legal value of a decision forcing a state 
to be obliged by a treaty to which some 
Security Council members themselves 
are not even signatories? In March 
2005, only 9 of the 15 member states 
of the Security Council (and 3 of the 
5 permanent members) were state-
parties to the ICC Statute. What is the 
legality of a decision taken by states 
which are not parties to a treaty to 
force another state to be a party to it, 
or to be bound by obligations under it? 
In fact, even if all the members of the 
Security Council had been state parties 
to the Rome Statute then this would 
not have changed the illegality of their 
decision. This is absolutely illegal, 
because it violates the very foundations 
of the international legal order. 
International courts used as a tool 
for crimes committed by the West
Several international criminal 
tribunals, including the ICC and ICTY 
(International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia) have been used by 
the West to further their aims in support 
of their international aggression. The 
three examples of Libya, Ukraine and 
Yugoslavia illustrate this tendency.
The situation in Libya was brought 
to the ICC by the UNSC in February 
2011, and decisions were made too 
fast for any meaningful investigation 
to have been completed. The ICC 
prosecutor prepared an order of 
arrest against the Libyan head of 
state Muammar Gaddafi. This order 
of arrest was issued when NATO was 
already involved in aggression against 
Libya. Thus the ICC acted as a ‘legal’ 
instrument of war. (It is noteworthy to 
mention that one of the judges in the 
case against Gaddafi was an Italian 
citizen and Italy was one of the states 
taking part in NATO aggression against 
Libya. Thus the ICC was violating the 
elementary principles of independence 
of the judiciary).
In April 2014 the International 
Criminal Court received the 
acceptance of its jurisdiction of the 
ICC from the Ukraine. The defect of 
this decision is that the request was 
sent by an improper subject. People 
who claimed to be “the government 
of Ukraine” had no legal justification 
for that claim. Notwithstanding that, 
the ICC agreed with that acceptance. 
It is difficult to understand how an 
international court may work with a 
government that took a power illegally 
through a bloody coup. The first task of 
the ICC is to check the legality of the 
subject appearing before it. 
To understand why this agreement 
constitutes taking part in a crime 
we have to look at the details of the 
acceptance of jurisdiction. The illegal 
government of Ukraine accepted 
the jurisdiction only for the purpose 
of prosecuting members of the 
overthrown government! By accepting 
jurisdiction from an illegal junta the 
ICC appears as a weapon of the coup 
d’etat committed in Ukraine. 
In 1999, during the aggression by 
NATO states against Yugoslavia, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) issued an 
order for the arrest of the President. 
Notwithstanding the fact that there was 
no investigation, the ICTY prosecutor 
issued an indictment against Slobodan 
Milošević, who died of a heart attack 
whilst in jail during the trial. In this way 
the ICTY was not impartial but became 
a tool of NATO in the war.
International courts as a tool of a 
radical change of international law.
The best scientific approach for 
understanding any subject demands 
the use of several different approaches. 
One of the obstacles to understanding 
the reality of the ICC is the exclusive 
use of the method of analysis. But it 
is important to also use the method 
of synthesis. This means that we have 
to look at ICC activities in the context 
of the activities of the whole system of 
international criminal justice. Use of 
synthesis will show us that ‘strange’ facts 
are not only the products of the ICC. 
These facts are reflected throughout 
all the international tribunals. It means 
that we are experiencing the creation 
of a whole system with specific aims 
and we have to detect these aims and 
understand them.
The first international criminal 
tribunal after the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
military international tribunals was the 
ICTY. The activity of the ICTY clearly 
shows that when it wished to convict a 
person for political reasons it deviated 
from existing international law and 
created its own law. In order to convict 
President Slobodan Milošević the ICTY 
inserted and used the concept of the 
so-called ‘joint criminal enterprise’ 
(JCE). The third category of this JCE 
allows the court to convict anybody, 
including persons who not only have 
not taken part in the said crimes, but 
were not even aware that these crimes 
were being committed! 
 The International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda violated the Convention 
on the prevention and punishment of 
the crime of genocide that prescribed 
the necessity to establish the specific 
intent. It decided that there was no 
need to establish the specific intent 
and that it was possible to convict a 
person for genocide even if intent 
was not established. This tribunal also 
‘corrected’ the genocide Convention, 
added to it some new features with the 
sole purpose of convicting the accused 
of this tribunal. The same ‘correction’ 
of existing international law was made 
by other international tribunals, like 
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone. 
Thus we a can detect another common 
feature of the international tribunals – 
the destruction of the already existing 
international law on one side and the 
creation of new international law on 
another side. Needless to stress that 
international courts do not have the 
power to either destroy existing law, or 
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to create new law.  However, the ICC 
and other international courts do not 
appear to accept existing international 
law as their framework.
Another example – the practice of 
‘proving’ cases with the use of plea 
bargaining. Officially it looks as if the 
accused pled guilty and gave testimony 
about his crimes. The reality of these 
guilty pleadings is very different. First 
of all the accused is not giving his own 
testimony but obliged to sign a text of 
‘facts’ prepared by the prosecution. 
The accused receives assurances that 
he will not receive a harsh sentence. 
The accused is obliged to give 
testimony against his co-accused. Thus 
the plea bargaining procedure is not 
aimed at establishing the truth, but 
at the conviction of certain accused 
parties with the use of the testimony 
of other accused parties that were 
forced to plead guilty. The practice of 
several international criminal tribunals 
(especially the ICTY and the ICTR) 
shows that plea bargaining is used with 
pressure. 
The whole practice of the ICTR 
was based on a false plea bargaining 
with the Rwanda Prime Minister Jean 
Kambanda. The whole Srebrenica 
case in the ICTY was based on plea 
bargaining with Dražen Erdemović and 
M Nikolić. In this context the ICC’s 
indictment against Simone Gbagbo 
(wife of President Laurent Gbagbo) was 
a clear attempt to resolve the case of 
President Gbagbo without trial. 
Another serious derogation of 
international law is a derogation of 
human rights law by the international 
tribunals. For example those accused 
in international criminal tribunals are 
denied the right to choose the counsel 
of their own choice. This denial has a 
very ‘good’ explanation. Only counsels 
approved by the ICC and other courts 
may defend these accused. In reality, 
this seeks to guarantee that the counsel 
will not go too far in establishing the 
truth. 
The only case when an ICC accused 
was able to get the defence counsel of 
his own choice was Jean-Pierre Bemba 
(Central African situation). That was 
secured by the ability of Bemba to 
finance his counsel himself (which is 
a unique case in the whole history of 
the international criminal justice). But 
in November 2013 the whole defence 
team of Bemba was arrested and put 
on trial. Officially the reason for this 
arrest was the attempt by the defence 
to prepare a false witness. It is of critical 
interest to note that the sudden arrest 
of Bemba’s defence counsels was 
conducted just some hours before the 
defence was about to present evidence 
about how the ICC prosecution was 
bribing witnesses. 
Bribing witnesses and presenting 
false witnesses is not an extraordinary 
event in the international criminal 
justice sytem. It is the rule rather than 
the exception.  To give two examples, 
in the Vojislav Šešelj trial at the ICTY 
more than 20 witnesses gave sworn 
testimony that they were threatened 
by the prosecution and pressurised to 
give false evidence against the accused. 
The Court took no action against the 
prosecution! Moreover the accused 
was prevented from presenting his 
Defence Case. This is an unique case 
in the whole history of international 
criminal justice. In the Milošević trial 
one prosecution witness confessed 
that he was pressurised (and even 
tortured) to give a false testimony 
against President Milošević. The court 
took no action and did not investigate 
the claim.
When examining the ICC’s activities 
in the context of activities of other 
bodies in the international criminal 
justice system a number of other 
important facts emerge:  the same 
staff are working in these institutions 
(running from one court to another, 
and sometimes even working in 
different courts at the same time!); 
the same judges work in these courts 
(running from one court to another and 
sometimes working in different courts 
at the same time!); and the courts use 
each other’s practice to set a legal 
precedent; thus, for example, the ICC 
is citing the decision of the ICTY as 
proof of its own legality.
Progressive international law versus 
regressive international law
The synthesis of the activity of the 
modern system of international justice 
allows us to detect new phenomena. 
But before we make a formulation 
about what this phenomenon is, it 
is important to stress, what it is not. 
The analysed phenomenon is not 
just the use of double standards. The 
analysed phenomenon is not just a 
violation of international law. The 
analysed phenomenon is not just the 
destruction of international law. All 
these enumerated phenomena are not 
new. What is really new is the creation 
of new international law. All the 
above mentioned problems of course 
exist – double standards, violation, 
destruction. But the important new 
feature is the creation of parallel 
international law.
Thus we have to conclude that the 
activity of the ICC is no way different 
from the activity of other organs of 
international criminal justice. The 
facts show that the main tasks of the 
international criminal justice system 
are the following:
• to act as a ‘legal’ tool for regime 
change, giving legitimacy to the 
removal of disobedient heads of 
states (situational aim); and
• to create a new body of international 
law which will reflect only the 
interests of the western powers 
(conceptual aim).
The phenomenon of the creation 
of new international law urges us to 
respond. Such response must be given 
in theoretical and practical ways.
From the theoretical point of view, 
we need to explain the objective 
reasons for this drastic change of 
international law as a social value. 
International law at every historical 
period reflects the exact level of 
international relations and the 
distribution of power between main 
(and other) participants of international 
relations. That is why international 
law in the 18th Century accepted war 
as a legal instrument in international 
relations and slavery as a perfectly 
legal practice. That is why international 
law in the 19th Century considered 
colonialism as a legal base for the 
division of states and peoples and a 
justification for the robbery of natural 
resources from the colonised countries. 
That law reflected the exact historical 
situation, when on the international 
scene there was no state or group of 
states able to present an alternative 
development for the whole world. This 
changed only after such a state (the 
Soviet Union) came into being and 
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later the formulation of a world socialist 
system. The first decree of the soviet 
government was the Decree on Peace. 
The modern principles of international 
law (like sovereign equality of states, 
non-interference in domestic affairs) 
seem to be obvious, but they came 
into existence exclusively because of 
the appearance of an alternative – and 
let us stress this specially – military and 
economically strong enough to defend 
this alternative world system.
The appearance and strengthening 
of the alternative world system 
allowed for the creation of new 
international law. This law was created 
by all members of the international 
community and in the interest of all 
(at least this was its stated aim). This 
international law became known as 
‘Progressive international law’. This 
name reflected the essence of this law 
– it reflected progress in international 
relations.
The destruction of the Soviet 
Union in December 1991 marked the 
beginning of the end of the system 
based on progressive international 
law. On May 1993 the first institution 
of the new system was established – 
the so-called International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
followed by a series of similar tribunals, 
for Rwanda, for Sierra Leone, for 
Cambodia, for Lebanon….
All these new courts and tribunals 
were directed to one operative aim 
– the indictment and removal of 
targeted heads of states. The ICTY 
removed and indicted president of 
Yugoslavia Slobodan Milošević and 
former president Milan Milutinović. 
It also indicted four more heads 
of states (though unrecognised) – 
Radovan Karadžić and Biljana Plavšić 
(presidents of Republic Srpska), Milan 
Martićc and Milan Babić (presidents 
of the Republic of Serbian Kraina). In 
addition to that all political and military 
leaders and administrators were 
indicted and removed in Yugoslavia 
and then Serbia. The Special Court for 
Sierra Leone removed the President of 
Liberia, Charles Taylor. The Tribunal 
for Rwanda indicted former Prime 
Minister of Rwanda Jean Kambanda. 
Finally the ICC indicted the President of 
Cote-d’Ivoire, Libyan leader Muammar 
Gaddafi, Kenyan president Uhuru 
Kenyatta and President of Sudan Omar 
al-Bashir…
The Al-Bashir case and South Africa
In June 2015 the ICC tried to 
force the South African government 
to arrest Sudanese President Omar 
al-Bashir who attended an AU meeting 
in Johannesburg. The North Gauteng 
High Court issued a decision obliging 
the SA government to arrest al-Bashir, 
and this decision was not implemented. 
Unfortunately the discussion on this 
matter was limited by the very narrow 
approach that was taken by the SA 
court, which was to some extent the 
result of very poor arguments presented 
by the state lawyers. But only to some 
extent, because nothing prevented the 
court from considering certain issues 
that courts are obliged to consider. 
First of all is the matter of jurisdiction. 
Even in the case when state lawyers 
did not raise any objection relating 
to jurisdiction, it was still the court’s 
obligation to decide this issue for itself. 
It did not do so.  Another mystery is 
why the court took the position that 
the obligation to cooperate necessarily 
meant the obligation to arrest, 
moreover to do this automatically. We 
are not going to analyse the arguments 
in the SA court decision in detail. What 
we would like to highlight nevertheless 
are those circumstances that somehow 
escaped the attention of the mass 
media and even judicial institutions. 
First of all, there was the artificial 
exclusion of the majority of judges 
from the adoption of the decision to 
force South Africa to arrest President 
al-Bashir. The decision [that is called 
the ‘ICC decision’] was adopted by a 
single judge. But the al-Bashir case is 
assigned not to a single judge but to 
a full Chamber constituted of three 
judges. Why were the other two judges 
not consulted? The formal answer to 
that question is that the decision was 
taken urgently. But this answer does 
not hold water, because the urgency 
of the decision was clearly the result 
of the intentionally late application by 
the prosecution. Information about 
al-Bashir’s visit to South Africa was 
available to the ICC months in advance 
but the prosecution decided to apply 
for request to arrest just some hours 
before this visit. The reason is obvious – 
to create the urgency and thus exclude 
two judges (i.e. the majority!) from the 
decision-making process. 
The other question arises with 
the attempt of the ICC (in reality – 
of one judge from the ICC) to force 
South Africa to arrest a sitting head of 
state, who, as such, enjoys immunity 
according to international law. Such an 
attempt was not legally supported. Any 
reference to article 27 of the ICC Statute 
is not convincing. This article says that 
‘immunities or special procedural 
rules which may attach to the official 
capacity of a person, whether under 
national or international law, shall 
not bar the Court from exercising its 
jurisdiction over such a person’. This 
article gave some commentators the 
wrong impression, leading to claims 
that nowadays heads of state no longer 
have immunity. In fact a more careful 
reading of this article shows that it is 
directed only to the ICC Prosecutor and 
other ICC officials, but not to states. 
This article relates only to the relations 
between accused and the Court. As 
concerns states, the immunities of 
heads of states and governments are 
regulated by norms of customary 
international law and treaties. These 
treaties clearly obliged the states to 
assure the immunity of the highest state 
officials. 
Moreover, the so-called al-Bashir 
case is not about Omar al-Bashir 
in his personal capacity. It is about 
the President of Sudan, i.e. about 
state sovereignty. Because of that the 
attempt of the ICC to force South 
Africa to arrest al-Bashir was an action 
against South Africa, bringing the state 
to a position when it is asked to destroy 
the very base of current international 
law – state sovereignty and equality. 
JUSTICE: THE ICC
It is difficult to 
understand how an 
international court 
may work with a 
government that 
took a power illegally 
through a bloody  
coup.
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The crystal clear nature of this situation 
raises the legitimate question as to why 
the ICC engaged in that provocation 
against South Africa. In retrospect, 
knowing the consequences (the SA 
court decision, its supposed non-
respect by the SA government, the 
impeachment move against the SA 
President etc.) we may suggest that this 
move was made with the intention of 
embarrassing the government of South 
Africa if not to destabilise the country.
Conclusions
To conclude, we have to see that 
for the moment there are two separate 
systems of international law. The 
first one is the current international 
law, often referred to as progressive 
international law. It is the result of 
the developments of the international 
system from 1945. The regime of 
this law is characterised by the aim 
(common interest for all members 
of the international community) and 
way of creation (made by all equal 
members of international community). 
The other system that is being created 
mainly through international courts 
and tribunals, is regressive international 
law. The regime of this law can be 
characterised using the same features 
but in negative terms: it is created 
by only certain ‘chosen states’ and 
operates only in their interest. Step by 
step this second system of regressive 
international law is becoming bigger 
and stronger. 
The modern world is more complex 
than it was in 1945. To understand the 
modern world we need at least proper 
definitions that correctly reflect the 
essence of objects and phenomena. It 
is interesting to note that the very lack 
of definitions sometimes acts as a base 
for non-existence of certain subjects 
or phenomena in our minds. One of 
the sharpest examples in this regard 
is the word ‘international’. We speak 
of international treaties, organisations, 
operations, politics… . Sometimes the 
use of this word is an obvious abuse, 
like in an expression ‘international 
judge’. The idea of a judge acting as 
a representative of the international 
community is clear, but does it have 
anything to do with reality? The 
judges are elected by other states 
but nominated by the state of their 
citizenship. In some cases the election 
process is a pure hypocrisy – when there 
is no competition between candidates 
and their number is the same (or nearly 
the same) as the number of places. 
In this situation we are facing not 
‘international’ institutions, but rather a 
group of foreign representatives.
While we have some treaties and 
organisations (like the United Nations) 
that could be more or less truly called 
international, we still have institutions 
that clearly may  not be defined as 
such. These institutions include the 
International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank, NATO, the European 
Union and the International Criminal 
Court. We have to notice the attempt 
made by some researchers to correct 
the situation and to introduce the 
new definition that better reflect the 
situation, namely introduction of the 
word ‘supranational’. This attempt is 
indeed very useful in defining the true 
nature of subjects like European Union 
institutions, but it is still not enough. 
International institutions were created 
for representation of the interest of 
the community of all states and for 
achieving common values and goals. 
Supranational institutions constitute a 
new phenomenon where the interest 
of such institutions may not necessarily 
coincide with the interests of member 
states. In such institutions the states 
sometimes are not the decision-
makers.
Nowadays the dichotomy national/
international does not properly 
reflect the real situation. Even the 
introduction of the supranational or 
even transnational levels does not 
change things. National, supranational 
and international are all nation-centric 
phenomena. But institutions like the 
ICC are contra-national phenomena. 
This level of politics reflects interest of a 
subject not connected with any state or 
group of states, though based in certain 
states. The interests of these subjects 
do not coincide with the interest of 
states or the international community 
as a whole. Moreover, sometimes the 
interests may be even contradictory. 
The strength of this subject is several 
times bigger than the power of most 
of the states. And as a de facto matter 
we witness the existence of certain 
institutions that assure a new level in 
politics. We suggest that this level may 
be called ‘contra-national’, stressing its 
centrifugal character, where the centre 
is a nation. 
Thus, we argue that the International 
Criminal Court is an institution of 
the contra-national level of politics. 
And its real aims and policy may be 
understood only in this context. The 
ICC was established with two main 
purposes: to create a universal judicial 
institution for controlling the highest 
level of national and international 
politics. The main ways to achieve this 
control are through creating the power 
to remove ‘disobedient’ heads of state 
and destroying the protection provided 
by existing national and international 
law through creating new [regressive/
repressive] international law. To be 
more correct – contra-national law.
To stop this process of the 
destruction of our international system 
and the seizing of power by contra-
national subjects, first of all we have to 
detect it, to realise that this is indeed 
happening, and to make others aware 
of it. And second we have to protest 
the process and make it clear that we 
reject it and all the results of its work. If 
the international community does not 
do that, one day we will wake up and 
discover that no signs of progressive 
international law exist anymore. The 
repressive contra-national law that the 
‘chosen forces’ are making for us now 
will become the only law available. 
In this context, understanding the 
underlying reasons behind the actions 
of the ICC and exposing what is 
happening is an essential step in our 
critical resistance to this real threat to 
our human rights for the foreseeable 
future. ■
JUSTICE: THE ICC
The activity of  
the ICTY clearly shows 
that when it wished 
to convict a person 
for political reasons it 
deviated from existing 
international law  
and created its  
own law.
